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Introduction
For nine years, Josef Taso had been shut out from his home in Bosnia.'
Forced to flee from his West Mostar home during the civil war, Taso and
his family crowded in with relatives on the Muslim side of town, while a
politically-connected Croat squatted in Taso's home rent-free. 2 But, despite
Taso's legal right to return to his home after the war, 3 Bosnian authoritiesdominated by Croats who want West Mostar to remain Muslim-freeignored his demands and blocked Taso from enforcing his claim. 4 The
municipal court refused to honor his right, as did the higher cantonal
court and the Federal Ministry of Justice. 5 However, during the month that
Taso appealed his case to the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chamber), the squatter finally fled Taso's home and moved to a
house that an international group had built for him. 6 Today, Taso is back
7
at his home with his family.
Taso is a mere droplet in a river of 2.3 million refugees forcibly driven
from their homes during the bloody ethnic cleansing campaigns of the
wars in the Balkans. 8 While the Taso case found a fortunate ending, hundreds of thousands of refugees remain the victims of ethnic cleansing
through legal and bureaucratic obstruction on the part of local authorities. 9 Yet Taso's success also symbolizes a rising respect for law in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (Bosnia), brought about in part by increasingly muscular
efforts from the Human Rights Chamber to force local officials to honor
1. See Brief for Appellant, Taso v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., Human Rights Chamber
for Bosn. & Herz. (June 20, 2000) (on file with author).
2. Id.
3. See Blentic v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/17, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (Nov. 5, 1997) (finding a positive obligation on government officials to take effective measures to ensure the return of homes to their lawful owners).
4. Taso, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. Report, American Refugee Committee, Legal Aid Office, Mostar, Bosnia (Sept.
12, 2000).
7. Id.
8. Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation: The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1092 (1998).
9. Id.
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their commitments to international human rights law. 10
The Human Rights Chamber is a unique supranational court of last
resort for Bosnian human rights victims. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) established the court, which allows human rights
claimants to bring their cases only after they have exhausted all effective
domestic remedies." Although the Chamber stumbled through years of
being undermined and ignored, in the last several years it has grown in
power, respect, and effectiveness. By helping instill a sense of the rule of
law, the Chamber has become a key instrument in the transition to a more
peaceful nation.
This essay argues that the Human Rights Chamber has set an important precedent for future international interventions; the Chamber provides
the key to legal accountability when all domestic systems are still bent on
vengeance. 1 2 By instituting the rule of law as a counterweight to partisans
set on preserving their wartime gains, the Chamber has helped make a
start toward civil society in a state that has continually dispensed justice
13
based on ethnic identity.
Institutions such as the Chamber can play a vital role in transitional
justice, easing the movement from an oppressive regime to a rule of law. A
long shelf of scholarship endorses transitional justice, yet theorists have
focused almost exclusively on the need for criminal justice, nearly ignoring
civil justice as a necessary component of the transition to a peaceful society. This oversight is unfortunate. After all, most conflicts are rooted in
the struggle for the control of property; this was particularly the case in
Bosnia. 14 By enforcing the civil side of human rights law, the Chamber
has pushed domestic authorities to respect the rule of law and encouraged
the return of refugees. In doing so, the Chamber has reduced the differences between the warring sides. Thus, as the ultimate avatar of civil justice in Bosnia, the Human Rights Chamber serves as an important
prerequisite in the transition to civil rule.
Part I of this essay delves into the background of Bosnia's unique constitution. This section summarizes the causes of the civil war and the diplomatic and political events leading up to the Dayton Accord. It then
discusses the effect of the civil war on property rights and why the partisan
leaders pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing. Next, the section discusses
10. See

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, BOSNIA'S REFUGEE LOGJAM BREAKS: IS THE INTER-

(May 2000), available at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
projects/balkans/bosnia/reports/A400061_31052000.pdf. See also Peter Ford, Restoring
Faith in Bosnian Law, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 22, 2000, at 6 (quoting Human
Rights Chamber President Michele Picard that "[wle are there to show that the authorities cannot do whatever they like, that there is some control over them").
11. See Paul C. Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/ParisPeace
Agreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 301, 309-10 (1996).
12. See Timothy William Waters, The Naked Land: The Dayton Accords, PropertyDisputes, and Bosnia's Real Constitution, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 517 (1999).
13. See Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an Embattled Region - Creating and Implementing the "Rules of the Road"for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1 (1999).
14. See Waters, supra note 12, at 518.
NATIONAL COMMUNITY READY?
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the Agreement itself, focusing on the human rights guarantees and the
institutions set in place to oversee them, particularly the Human Rights
Chamber. Finally, the section explains the Chamber's developing case law
and the safeguards it has established in its decisions. The section concludes that by fostering enforceable legal doctrine in Bosnia, the Chamber
has created a reliable rule of law.
Part II explores the factors underlying the Chamber's efficacy by highlighting both the trends running through its decisions and the nature of the
political pressure needed to effectively enforce those decisions. The
change in the Chamber's influence also makes it an excellent laboratory for
testing the conditions necessary for a court of this type to be effective.
Part III then places the Chamber into the context of transitional justice
and demonstrates the vital role of civil law in the journey forward from a
state based on oppression. Finally, with the benefit of hindsight, this section draws lessons from the Human Rights Chamber's experience that
should be kept in mind for future international interventions. Although
the Human Rights Chamber has proved critical to accountability in Bosnia,
this essay concludes that the Chamber will ultimately encounter difficulty
extricating itself from the government. After all, if the Human Rights
Chamber has indeed become a vital balance of power in Bosnia, then it
cannot disband without causing either a governmental crisis or a relapse
into tyranny.
I.

Background

A. A Brief History
1. Events Leading Up to the Civil War
Bosnia's birth was much like its recent rebirth. It broke away from the
Kingdom of Serbia in A.D. 960 and then struggled to maintain its independence, fending off competing jurisdictional claims from Orthodox and
Latin Christendom. ' 5 When the Turks conquered the region in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, many of the nation's wealthiest landowners
converted to Islam. However, for much of their rule, the Ottomans never
forced Islam on their subjects, and tolerated the many Latin and Orthodox
Christians in Bosnia. Thus, for five centuries of Ottoman rule, Bosnia was
a diverse and complex society of Orthodox (Serb) and Latin (Croat) Christians, dominated politically and socially by Moslems (Bosniaks). Nevertheless, throughout the centuries, the different religious and ethnic
16
communities in Bosnia have tended to live in peace with one another.
15. See William H. McNeill, Introduction to Ivo ANDRIC, THE BRIDGE ON THE DRINA at
1 (Lovett F. Edwards trans., Univ. Chicago Press 1977).
16. NOEL MALCOLM, BOSNIA: A SHORT HISTORY, at xix-xxi (1996) (noting that the
violence surrounding the 1990s conflict was, like the two world wars in Bosnia, largely
the result of external sources). In examining the evolution of modern Bosnia, it is helpful to consider the view of some commentators who have noted that ethnic groups are
often "imagined communities" where "boundaries between ethnic groups are often fluid,
that their histories are often based on myth as much as fact, and that their members'
belief in a common origin that derives sharply from their neighbors' may be mistaken."

2002

The Importance of Civil Law in the Transition to Peace

393

Any animosities that did exist in Bosnia were in large part economic and
not based on ethnic or religious differences. 17 However, as the Ottoman
Empire weakened in the nineteenth century, rival empires began jockeying
for power in the region.
At the end of the nineteenth century, leading Bosnian intellectuals,
educated in the nationalist ferment of the German universities, returned
home with the idea that language and ethnicity should define
nationhood.1 8 This theory has worked well unifying a largely homogeneous state. 19 But, where ethnicities differ and are historically hostile, ethnonationalism can pull a country apart. 20 If ethnicity defines the state and
there exists no single ethnicity, then there can be no state. 21
That danger did not stop the nationalist ferment. Fired by nationalist
ideals and a declining economy, successive revolts by Bosniaks, Serbs, and
Croats in Bosnia led to western intervention. 2 2 Despite intense diplomatic
efforts, the Austria-Hungarian Empire placed Bosnia under its protectorate.
When Austria-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand paraded through
Sarajevo in 1914, a Serbian nationalist who wanted to fold Bosnia into Serbia assassinated the empire's heir apparent and began World War I. After
the war, the Allies sided with the Serb nationalists and incorporated Bosnia
23
into a new country called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
As the world fell into depression in the 1930s, external sources of conflict increased the tensions of civil life in Bosnia. 24 During the 1940s,
these tensions boiled over. Only the greater atrocity of World War II
masked the brutal civil war in Bosnia. Bosnians killed more of themselves
in this civil war than they killed in the greater world conflict. Nevertheless,
in bringing Yugoslavia into the Cold War era, Marshal Tito papered over
25
this violence in the name of unity.
In doing so, Tito redefined Yugoslavian nationhood as the sum of the
Balkan peoples. Tito emphasized the "brotherhood and unity" of the counDavid Wippman, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 4 (David

Wippman ed., 1998) (citing Benedict Anderson's evocation of the term "imagined communities"). Wippman believes that there is a real concrete core of identity in ethnic
groups, but this core can be used as a base from which members of groups are mobilized. Ethnic identity thus becomes a somewhat malleable social construct; ethnic division can be created and accentuated based upon the real core of ethnic identity. Id.
17. See MALCOLM, supra note 16, at xxi (arguing that much of the economic conflict
during the Ottoman times was between Muslim landlords and Christian peasants over
their economic relationships and the control of property, not over their religious beliefs
or practices).
18. See McNeill, supra note 15, at 2.
19. ROBERT M. HAYDEN, BLUEPRINTS FOR A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LOGIC
OF THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICTS 141 (2002).

20. Id. at 142.
21. Id.
22.

See ROBERTJ. DONIA &JOHN V. A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: A TRADITION

BETRAYED 113 (1994).
23. See id. at 120-23.
24. See id. at 133. See also MALCOM, supra note 16, at ch. 12.
25. DONIA & FINE, supra note 22, at 194.
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try's closely related and economically interdependent people. 2 6 Tito's
logic, the same rationale used by Gandhi and Nehru in India, flipped the
old thinking on its head: now a people came to be defined by the state, not
the state by its people. On the surface, the effort succeeded. By the end of
the Tito regime, the economies of the region were utterly intertwined and
mixed marriages were common. 2 7 The number of people identifying themselves as "Yugoslav," rather than, for example, "Croat" quadrupled from
1971 to 1981.28

Nevertheless, the list of the peoples of Yugoslavia excluded Bosniaks
until 1963.29 And in 1974, the Yugoslav constitution changed the state to
a confederation, sowing the seeds for disintegration fifteen years later.
Moreover, despite the efforts at building regional unity for Yugoslavia, in
the rare instances in the twentieth century that free and open elections
were held in Bosnia, the majority of voters still voted as a bloc with their
30
own ethnic groups.
Thus, once the gauze of socialism came off Yugoslavia, the constituent
republics quickly reverted to nationalism. But unlike Croatia and Slovenia,
the population of Bosnia was exactly splintered in ethnic makeup, 3 1 and
the Bosnian Serbs and Croats had powerful and aggressive siblings to aid
them from neighboring nations.
2.

Analysis of Events Leading to Civil War

In the early 1990s, one popular theory in the United States held the
Balkan war as proof that the new world crises would revolve around the
clash of cultures, with Bosnia as the fault line of Islamic, Orthodox and
Roman Catholic cultures. 32 Another common view of the Bosnian civil war
held that a millennium-old feud had flared anew.
What seems apparent in the former Yugoslavia is that the past continues to
torment because it is not the past. These places are not living in a serial
order of time but in a simultaneous one, in which the past and present are a
continuous, agglutinated mass of fantasies, distortions, myths, and lies.
Reporters in the Balkan wars often observed that when they were told atrocity stories, they were occasionally uncertain whether these stories had
33
occurred yesterday or in 1941, or 1841, or 1441.
26. Hayden, supra note 19, at 142.
27. Janez Kovac and Tanya Domi, Friedman Triggers Controversy, INSTITUTE FOR WAR
AND PEACE REPORTING, Feb. 1, 2001, available at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/

bcr/bcr_20010201_4-eng.txt.
28. Hayden, supra note 20, at 27 (citing Steven Burg & Michael Berbaum, Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 535

(1989)).
29. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The FracturedSoul of the Dayton Peace Agreement: A Legal
Analysis, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 957, 967 (1998).
30. Hayden, supra note 19, at 92.
31. See id. at 93.
32. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer
1993, at 22.
33. Michael Ignatieff, The Elusive Goal of War Trials, HARPERS, Mar. 1996, quoted in
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE
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Increasingly, however, historians and other writers have come to view
the hostilities not as a direct result of history, but rather simply as a heuristic device covering deeper or more venal motives. 3 4 One of the leading
historians of Bosnia, Noel Malcom, notes that "the history of Bosnia in
itself does not explain the origins of this war. ' 3 5 These commentators and
researchers have come to adopt a new, more critical view of the Bosnian
conflict of the 1990s. These writers focus on the actions of a small group
of leaders and their political and economic allies, all of whom manipulated
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia (Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia or "SFRY") for their own personal, economic, and political gain.
Noel Malcolm argues that the killing strategies in Bosnia were not set by
average people "nursing grudges about the second world war," but "by
young urban gangsters in expensive sunglasses from Serbia, members of
the paramilitary forces raised by Arkan and others . . . carry[ing] out a
rational strategy dictated by their political leaders-a method carefully cal36
culated to drive out two ethnic populations and radicalize a third."
Control of property might have been one root of the conflict-whoever
controlled the property controlled its resources and the economy. 37 From
this standpoint, the demagogues, corrupt politicians, and organized
criminals who contrived the brutal human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing campaigns of the civil war were fundamentally driven by their desire to
control property, and thus achieve wealth and power. 38 By creating the
"ethnically pure" states of the Republika Srpska and Bosnian Croat Republic of "Herzeg-Bosna" these leaders could secure their gains. As one close
observer of the conflict remarked, ethnic identity seemed to be "simply the
raison d'etre for these nationalist leaders to hold onto power, like animals
who cling to their turf."39 Accepting the return of minorities into these
areas, then, would require the nationalists to deny freely one of the ratio40
nales for the conflict itself.
14 (1998). See ROBERT D. KAPLAN, BALKAN GHOSTS: A JOURNEY
(1993); ELIZABETH DREW, ON THE EDGE: THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY
143-163 (1994) (Clinton quickly researches the background on Bosnia and makes the
millennial-feud conclusion).
34. See RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR 22-23 (1998); Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger,
Foreign Policy Decisionmakers as Practical-intuitive Historians: Applied History and Its
AND

MASS VIOLENCE

THROUGH

HISTORY

Shortcomings, 30 INT'L STUD. Q. 223, 242-43 (1986).
35. MALCOLM, supra note 16, at xix.
36. Id. at 252. Malcolm also notes that much of the millennial-feud theory was
based upon poor and biased writing which relied upon "fragments of historical misinformation." Id. at xix-xxiv.
37. See Waters, supra note 12, at 520.
38. Id. at 517-593.
39. United Nations High Commissioner Carlos Westendorp, quoted in Chris Hedges,
Diplomat Rules Bosnia With a Strong Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1998 at A10.
40. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, Is DAYTON FAILING? BOSNIA FOUR YEARS AFTER
THE PEACE AGREEMENT

(1999) available at http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/balkans/

bosnia/reports/A400058_28101999.pdf;

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DENIED JUSTICE:

(2000) available at http://www.crisisweb.org/
projects/balkans/bosnia/reports/A400059 23022000.pdf.
INDIVIDUALS

LOST

IN A
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By any of these explanations, the conflict could never be quelledshort of total victory by one side-unless outside forces intervened. And if
the raison d'etre for Bosnia's leaders was the economic and political
rewards of power, then it followed that they would not adhere to the rule of
law without effective, external oversight and pressure. That outside control
came with the Dayton Accord that ended the war.
3.

Diplomatic Efforts Leading to the Dayton Accord

The Human Rights Chamber and the international conventions it
enforces have their roots well before Dayton. In Bosnia's last gasp as a state
before plunging into full-scale civil war, a compromise constitution negotiated in March 1992 held Bosnia to the highest standard of human rights as
defined in international human rights conventions. 4 1 At the first peace
conference nine months later, the Vance-Owen Peace Plan proposed creating an ombudsperson and a human rights court, both controlled interna42
tionally and charged with enforcing international human rights norms.

The next proposal for a constitution for the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina, written in Washington, D.C. in 1994, sketched an outline for these
institutions. 43 Now the mandate for the ombudsman and human rights
court would extend to "all legal provisions relating to human rights or fundamental freedoms" involving cases since January 1, 199 1.44 In turn, "all
organs of government shall carry out and assist in implementing judgments and orders of all courts. ' 4 5 The proposed constitution also established Judicial Police to assist the ombudsperson and courts in enforcing
decisions. 4 6 Most striking is that fifteen major human rights conventions 4 7 carry a direct legal effect, giving Bosnia, on paper, one of the most
comprehensive systems for the enforcement of human rights in the
41. See Hayden, supra note 19, at 100.
42. See Szasz, supra note 11, at 302.
43. For highlights of the proposal, see Documents: Overview of the Federal Constitu-

tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2

BALKAN FORUM

33 '(1994).

44. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosn. & Herz., Dec. 14, 1995,
art. IV.C.19, Bosn. & Herz-Croat.-Yugo., 35 I.L.M. 89, reproduced in UN Doc. A/50/790S/1995/999, Nov. 29, 1995 [hereinafter Dayton Accord].
45. See id. at art. IV.C.2.
46. See id. at art. IV.C.8[4].
47. Id. at Annex 6, app. The treaties are: the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Geneva Protocols,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the European Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, the Convention on the Rights of
the Child, the International Covenant on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Their Families, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages,
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Most signatory
states regard conventions such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
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48

world.
The United States prodded Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia into the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialed
in Dayton, Ohio on November 21, 1995 and entered into force on December 14, 1995. 49 The agreement incorporated the proposed constitution,
and established a Human Rights Commission comprised of an Ombudsperson and a Human Rights Chamber.50 The Human Rights Chamber
was closely modeled on the European Court of Human Rights, which is
51
governed by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
Unfortunately, the Dayton Accord also incorporated a glaring weakness. The Accord holds human rights to the highest international standard, yet because the extremist nationalist groups had gained power over
their political entities through ethnic cleansing campaigns, the Accord
drew the political boundaries of the country and created separate entities
(and the division of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina into cantons) according to ethnicity.5 2 Thus, Bosnian Serbs now control the
Republika Srpska; Bosniaks dominate Sarajevo and parts of central Bosnia;
and Bosnian Croats secured West Mostar and western Bosnia. By giving
the ethnic groups political sway over the regions and yet outlawing discrimination based on ethnicity, the effects of ethnic cleansing are both outlawed
and written into the law. The result has been that a "serious commitment
by the State [of Bosnia and Herzegovina] to provide support to the institutions that protect these human rights . . . is lacking." 53 This dilemma
would give the Human Rights Chamber a nearly impossible task to
54
reconcile.
Cultural Rights as aspirational, but Bosnia has incorporated the treaty as law, and so is
legally responsible for guaranteeing, for instance, food and shelter to all of its citizens.
48. See Michael O'Flaherty, Report on the Conference on Human Rights in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: From Theory to Practice, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:

FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 7 (Wolfgang Benedek ed., 1999); see also Waters, supra note
12, at 536.
49. See Dayton Accord, supra note 44.
50. See Dayton Accord, supra note 44, Annex 6.
51. Eur. Conv. On H.R. The treaty guarantees the right to life, the right to property,
the right to a fair hearing, the right not to be discriminated against, the right to education, the right to freedom of movement and freedom of residence and others. The fourteen other human rights treaties in Bosnia's constitution also govern the Chamber.
52. See Art. I of the Agreement ("The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina ... shall
continue its legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure
as modified herein ..." Dividing the country into two entities, with the Republika Srpska controlled by the Serbs [Art 1(3)] and Bosniaks and Croats sharing the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. See also Zoran Pajic, A CriticalAppraisal of the Dayton Constitution, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE (Wolfgang
Benedek et. al, 1998) 1, 34 ("Inter-entity boundaries follow, by and large, the frontline
established by the war; the current ethnic map of Bosnia and Herzegovina accurately
illustrates the policy of enforced expulsion and displacement of people, carried out on
ethnic criterium.")
53. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2000)
[hereinafter Human Rights Chamber].

54. This problem would be worsened by the fact that the international community
saw the Dayton Accord as the blueprint for the final settlement of the war, while many of
the competing parties in the war saw the Dayton process as merely a "way station, a
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B. The Structure of the Human Rights Chamber in the Dayton Accord
1. Organization
The eight international members, who are selected by the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe, dominate the fourteen-judge chamber.5 5 The Council also selects the president of the Chamber, who has
been Michele Picard, a French jurist.5 6 The other six members are domestic-four from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two from the
Republika Srpska. 57 The judges are appointed for five-year terms and may
58
be re-appointed.
Although the members are selected according to their nationality, the
Chamber is intended to be independent. 5 9 The international judges are
not answerable to the Council of Europe and the domestic jurists do not
answer to their respective governments. 60 The judges are obliged to recuse
themselves from a case if they have previously participated or have a personal interest in the case. 6 1 However, a judge who participates in the consideration of a case is obliged to vote on the judgment and may not
abstain. 62 When the Chamber was set up under the Dayton Accord, its
mandate lasted for five years, until the end of 2000. However, the parties to
63
the Accord agreed in June 2000 to extend its mandate for another year.
2.

Scope

In establishing the Human Rights Chamber, the drafters of the Dayton
Accord gave it a limited mandate. The Chamber may only decide issues
brought before it by a person within Bosnia's physical jurisdiction who is a
bona fide victim of a human rights abuse. 6 4 Before the Chamber can hear
the petitioner's case, however, the claimant must first exhaust all effective
domestic remedies. 65 Nor may the Chamber hear the case unless the party
alleges violations of the international human rights agreements incorpo66
rated in the Dayton Accord that occurred after the Accord was signed.
means of continuing the struggle for dominance and control." Waters, supra note 12, at
518.
55. See Leif Berg, Procedure Before The Human Rights Chamber, in A PRACTITIONER'S
GUIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER at 2, 3 (on file with the author).
56. Id. For the current members, see HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER, supra note 53.
57. See Berg, supra note 55.

58. See Dayton Accord, supra note 44, at art. VII(3), Annex 6.
59. See Berg, supra note 55, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Rules of Procedure, 21 and 22, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz.
(adopted Dec. 13, 1996).
62. Id. at 19(3), 52(4) and 61.
63. See Afghanistan, Terrorism, Africa, Continuing Middle East Violence Among Crucial
Issues for Security Council in 2001, U.N. SC/7266 at 15 (Jan. 14, 2002), referring to UN
SC Resolution 1357,
64. Berg, supra note 55, at 4, 5, 19 (citing Art. VIII of the Dayton Accord).
65. See Dayton Accord, supra note 44, at art. VIII(2), Annex 6.
66. See, e.g., Matanovic v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/1, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz. (Sept. 13, 1996) (decision on admissibility) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS
CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS 1996-1997.
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For instance, if someone has lost his job, he has no recourse to the Cham67
ber unless he can prove illegal discrimination.
While limiting the reach of the Chamber, however, the Dayton Accord
incorporated means for the Chamber to be able to deal pragmatically with
the political realities on the ground in Bosnia. The Chamber gets around
the time restraints if violations occurred before the Accord, but continued
after December 14, 1995.68 In addition, in establishing the Chamber, the
Dayton Accord included the word "effective" in the requirement for exhaustion of all domestic remedies by an applicant bringing a claim before the
Chamber. The inclusion of this key term has allowed the Chamber to
respond to claims by applicants that have been mired in administrative and
legal obstruction for years with no clear resolution. 6 9
3.

Remedies

If the situation requires, the Chamber has the power to issue an
injunction before reaching its ultimate judgment. 70 If the Chamber finds
in favor of the claimant, it can issue a cease and desist order, award monetary damage, order a domestic court or police to take action and even overturn legislation. 7 1 If the Chamber issues such an order and the Federation
or some other defendant ignores its obligation, the Chamber then informs
the Office of the High Representative (OHR).7 2 The OHR is responsible for
67. See S.K. v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/1387, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz., para. 12-13 (May 14, 1999) complied in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND

DECISIONS JAN.-JULY 1999, 451 (1999) (finding a housing complaint inadmissible because no discrimination alleged).
68. See, e.g., O.R. v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/411, Human Rights Chamber
for Bosn. & Herz. (Apr. 5, 1999) (decision on admissibility) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS
HERZEGOVINA,

CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JANUARY - JULY 1999, 286, 287 (1999)

(declining jurisdiction, but ruling that a case would be admissible where the alleged
wrong occurred before the cut-off date, but where the court decision from which the
applicant appeals was decided after December 14, 1997); Bastijanovic v. Fed'n of Bosn.
& Herz., CH/96/8, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 4, 1997) compiled in
HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS 1996-1997 (finding
the Chamber competent to try the case where the alleged property taking occurred
before December 14, 1995, but where "the continuing absence of an effective remedy"
continued past that date).
69. Interview with Therese Nelson, Executive Officer, Human Rights Chamber, in
Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Sept. 25, 2001). If the Chamber required all domestic remedies
to be completely exhausted prior to filing a claim then a party located in the Federation
might have to file claims and appeals with a municipal administrative body, a municipal
court, a cantonal court, the Supreme Court, the Human Rights Court, the Constitutional
Court of the Federation, and the Ombudsman's Office of the Federation before the party
could file an appeal with the Human Rights Chamber. Thus, requiring the exhaustion of
all these administrative processes would delay the resolution of any single case for years.
See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DENIED JUSTICE: INDIVIDUALS LOST IN A LEGAL MAZE,
supra note 40.
70. See Berg, supra note 55, at 17.
71. See Medan v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/3, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 4, 1997) (decision on admissibility) compiled in
HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND

MERITS, 1996-1997 (1997).
72. Dayton Accord, supra note 44, Annex 10; see also HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER,
ANNUAL REPORT 1998 7 (1998).
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monitoring the domestic government and coordinating the international
groups. However, the Dayton Agreement never provided the Chamber with
enforcement power of its own. 73 As such, the Human Rights Chamber

must rely on other institutions to enforce its decisions, and the Parties have
proved puissant at subverting the Chamber's decisions.
II. The Human Rights Chamber in Practice
A. Overview
Dominated by foreign jurists, the Human Rights Chamber rarely sides
with the government, and yet domestic authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina are obliged to obey its rulings. 7 4 The Chamber's legal ability to
enforce a rule of law in the face of anarchy or ethnic warfare has attracted
the attention of diplomats and other international law experts who regard
the Human Rights Chamber as a global precedent for future international
humanitarian interventions. 75 Yet its critics have accused the Chamber
either of exercising heavy-handed neo-colonial rule, 7 6 or, on the other
hand, of possessing broad powers to achieve justice and fearing to use
77
them.
Indeed, for the first three years of the Chamber's operation, its example was unimpressive. International peacekeeping groups declined to back
up the Chamber's rulings with legal or police action. 78 At the same time,
Federation and domestic authorities routinely skirted their obligation to
obey Chamber rulings, 79 while an increasing flood of claimants backlogged the Chamber's docket. 80 Worse, minorities continued to suffer human
rights violations in the form of property theft, 8 1 education 82 and employ73. Annex 10, Article I extends the OHR's mandate only to monitoring and discus-

sion with international and domestic authorities. It strictly prevents the OHR from
ordering international troops into action. Annex 6, Article Vprovides that when the
OHR learns of a human rights violation, "appropriate steps" include calling the matter
to the attention of the Parties and reporting to the United Nations.
74. See Dayton Accord, supra note 44, Annex 6.
75. See, e.g., Ni Aloain, supra, note 29, at 978; Elizabeth M. Cousens, Making Peace in
Bosnia Work, 30 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 789, 801 (1997).
76. See, e.g., Zoran Pajic, A CriticalAppraisalof Human Rights Provisions of the Dayton
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 20 HUM. RTs. Q. 125, 126 (1998) ("the Dayton
Agreement implicitly puts Bosnia and Herzegovina under the protectorate of the international community").
77. See, e.g., Laura Palmer & Cristina Posa, The Best-Laid Plans: Implementation of
the Dayton Peace Accords in the Courtroom and on the Ground, 12 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 361
(1999).
78. Id. at 368.
79. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

GROUP,

DAYTON ACCORDS FAILING, February 1999; Ford,

supra note 10.
80. UNITED NATIONS

HIGH COMMISSIONER ON REFUGEES,

UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT 2000

388 (2000) (reporting that the Chamber now has more than 2,000 cases on its docket).
81. Krstan Cegar v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/21, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 46 (Apr. 6, 1998).
82. Matanovic v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/1, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (Sept. 13, 1996) (decision on admissibility) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER
FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS 1996-1997.
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ment discrimination,8 3 and often outright violence. 84 However, with the
end of the international presence in Bosnia now on the horizon, the last
two years have seen a dramatic shift in both the pace of Chamber deci85
sions, and the international, domestic, and popular responses to them.
B. The Early Years of Impotence
The first years after a peace agreement ending a civil war is signed are
usually fraught with improvisation and tension; the parties to the agreement tend to seize any opportunity to "obstruct, revise and sabotage" the
agreement. 8 6 The Dayton Accord was no exception. The local and national
authorities resisted implementation of the Accord where they could-blocking minority returns and seeking to solidify the gains made during the civil
conflict. As a result, the Chamber found itself beset on every side with
obstacles to establishing a rule of law. Property crimes and bureaucratic
sabotage formed the major challenge.
87
If the "rule of law" includes both legal process and legal content,
then Bosnia is lacking, particularly in the former. Bosnia-like many of the
states of the former Yugoslavia-has had no experience with a democratic
legal system or an independent judiciary. As a result, Bosnia suffers from
having a large gap between the modern legislation contained within the
Dayton Accord and the implementation of these laws. 88 Instead, the legal
system in postwar Bosnia allows judicial and administrative authorities to
"wantonly victimize and abuse citizens."'8 9 The legal system in postwar
Bosnia fails to meet the norms recognized in other industrialized countries,
including other post-communist countries of Europe. 90 Particularly lacking is a form of rule of law that enshrines the rights of the individual to
enjoy procedural notions of fair, consistent treatment and predictability. 9 1
The discrimination in some regions of Bosnia was so entrenched that
reports found that courts were created and maintained not only to protect
those of the same ethnicity, 9 2 but also to serve as a wall of prejudice to
block the rights of those of a differing ethnicity-a process of discrimina93
tion that has formed a component of Bosnian justice since the war years.
Extremist authorities in some areas had openly refused to accept the jurisdiction of the Federation Supreme Court, meaning in effect that there was
no effective legal appeal or rule of law beyond these same hard-line officials
83. See Zahirovic v. Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/67, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (July 8, 1999).

84. See UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, INCIDENTS IN CANTON
IN THE CONTEXT OF MINORITY RETURNS (July 1998).
85. See Nelson, supra note 69.
86.

See Cousens, supra note 75, at 804.

87. See Waters, supra note 12, at 562.
88. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 79, at 25.
89.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DENIED JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 1.

90. Waters, supra note 12, at 561.
91.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, DENIED JUSTICE, supra note 40.

92. Id.
93. Id. at 19.
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and their policy decisions. 94
The obstruction and refusal to accept the rule of law extended beyond
the court system. "Administrative silence" has, in the words of one report,
"become normal in the daily work of public administration at all levels." 9 5
Municipal officials have used administrative silence to obstruct the return
96
of minority refugees and to block them from filing their property claims.
To obstruct refugees further, local officials have intentionally manipulated
or misread laws and regulations. For instance, although Article 1, Section
4 of Chapter 1 of the Dayton Accord expressly enshrines refugees' right of
return, local officials argued that the section nonetheless allowed them to
give primacy to displaced persons of their own ethnicity over the rights of
refugees of another ethnicity. 97 The officials made this argument despite
the fact that the right of return of all citizens is clearly delineated elsewhere
in the Dayton Accords-and is one of the basic tenets of the agreementand forms part of the Bosnian Constitution.
The United Nations Mission for Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that
the failure of municipal authorities to apply property laws, 98 as well as
their tendency to discriminate against minorities within the judicial process, resulted in a denial of justice and lack of execution of court orders. 9 9
In fact, courts throughout Bosnia have obstructed citizens in the exercise of
their rights through a variety of means, including the failure to schedule
hearings on cases, or to hand down decisions in cases, as well as through
the issuing of illegal rulings and decisions to delay cases involving the
rights of minority parties. 100 In some areas, courts have acted in concert
94. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP,

(ESI),
NIAN

supra note 79,

at

3;

EUROPEAN STABILITY INITIATIVE

RESHAPING INTERNATIONAL PRIORITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA PART ONE: BosPOWER STRUCTURES 8 (Oct. 14, 1999) available at www.esiweb.org/pages/

reports.html [hereinafter "ESI"].
95. See ESI, supra note 94. Commentators use the term "administrative silence" in
Bosnia to refer to what is known in American legal practice as administrative nonfeasance. In Bosnia, administrative silence has many aspects. In particular, the term
encompasses the practice by authorities and administrative organs of not denying
claims, but rather merely refusing to answer or acknowledge a claim or appeal. This
results in an inability of the applicant to have his or her case or claim reviewed by other
officials.

96. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH), REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (September 16, 1998).
97. Local officials often employ this rationale to explain why they cannot evict dis-

placed persons from the property of minority refugees who legally own the apartments
and houses.
98. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (UNMIBH), REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA para. 35
(Mar. 16, 1999) available at http://unmibh.org/news/sgrep/16mar1999.asp.

99. Id. See ESI, supra note 94, at 6.
100. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, RULE OVER LAW: OBSTACLES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY IN BIH 13 (July 5, 1999). The Deputy Program Manager of the ARC Legal Aid Program, Bayro Avdic, noted in an interview that of all the
cases the organization had filed with local courts in 2000 and 2001 not a single hearing
had been scheduled by judges in any of the cases. All of the cases involved representation of minority parties seeking to reclaim pre-war property expropriated and denied to
them during the conflict and post-conflict period. Interview with Bayro Avdic, Deputy
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with extremist elements, handing down decisions that stripped individuals
of their property rights in violation of both the facts on the ground and the
ECHR.10 1
If the underlying goal of those behind the conflict was the accumulation of resources and property, then it could be expected that these same
actors would resist efforts to return control of these resources to their lawful owners. Indeed, this has been the case in Bosnia since the signing of
the Dayton Accord. Minorities seeking to reclaim property, jobs, and social
benefits lost during the war have faced a wall of obstruction by local officials. During the war, all sides to the conflict enacted sets of property laws
that at their core were designed to exclude minorities and block the return
of other ethnic groups. 10 2 Thus, politics, and not the rule of law, governs
10 3
the return process.
1.
(a)

Property Rights Violations
Background

When workers' housing went up in the 1960s and 1970s, socialist
Yugoslavia gave tenants a guarantee of lifetime tenancy-a property right
that tenants could then pass to their children. This guarantee became a
contract during the post-Cold War effort to privatize. t 0 4 Such a right
amounts to a legal possession and is protected under the ECHR.I 0 5 However, during the ethnic cleansing and violence of the civil war, millions fled
their homes. Many escaped to regions controlled by their ethnicity and
10 6
moved into apartments that minorities of that region had abandoned.
With half of Bosnia's capital stock damaged or destroyed during the
war, 10 7 the refugees made the abandoned apartments their permanent resiProgram Manager, ARC Legal Aid Office, Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sept. 21,
2001). In one Chamber case, a government agency explained that it did not provide
information critical to settling an employment discrimination claim filed by a former
employee for over five years because the agency's building was undergoing renovation
and the agency supposedly did not have access to the needed documents. The Chamber
noted that despite national law requiring all employment cases to be handled with
urgency, the lower court had accepted this excuse for more than five years. See Cuturic
v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/1171, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 11,
35 (Oct. 8, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
DECISIONS AUG.-DEC. 1999.
101. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, RULE OVER LAW, supra note 100, at 22-23.
102. See Waters, supra note 12, at 538-50.
103. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REUNIFYING MOSTAR: OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS 38 (Apr. 19, 2000). See also ESI, supra note 94.
104. See Elena Popovic, The Impact of International Human Rights law on the Property

Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in

POST-WAR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 148-49 (Michael O'Flaherty & Gregory Gisvold eds. 1998).

105. See MJ. v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/28, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz., para. 32 (Nov. 7, 1997) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND MERITS, 1996-1997 ("an occupancy right is a
valuable asset . . . which constitutes a 'possession' within the meaning of Article 1 as
interpreted by the European Commission and Court").
106. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REUNIFYING MOSTAR, supra note 103, at 37.
107. WORLD BANK ET AL., BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: TOWARDS ECONOMIC RECOVERY
10-12 (1996).
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dences under the protection of partisan leaders.1 08
At the war's end, all sides agreed to allow conditions to return to the
status quo ante. All refugees were to be allowed to return to their rightful
homes and former lives. 10 9 But, the Dayton Accord also provided that
most areas controlled by ethnic groups during the civil war would remain
under those groups' control after the war. 110 In order to remain in control
of their areas, the ethnic leaders could not allow their voting bloc to
become diluted by other ethnicities.' t ' To exclude the other ethnicities,
the partisan leaders had to prevent their legal right to return to their property. Thus, like the war itself, property was the main issue the Chamber
confronted when it opened its doors in Sarajevo in 1996.112
(b) The JNA Cases
The first test came quickly. Within a month of signing the Dayton
Accord and agreeing to return all property to its former owners, the Federation signaled its insincerity when it passed a law taking back all apartment
sales made under a 1991 privatization effort by the Yugoslav National
Army (JNA). 113 The move deprived thousands of Bosniaks, Croats and
Serbs of their property, 11 4 but because it was a blatant violation of the
ECHR and other international human rights conventions, every victim had
recourse to the Chamber.' 1 5 Faced with victims flooding its dockets,' 16
the Chamber nevertheless responded by answering each claim individually, clogging its resources for months.' t 7 And despite the Chamber's
insistence that the Federation's law be repealed,1 18 the Federation ignored
108.
109.
110.
111.

See, e.g., Medan, supra note 71.
Dayton Accord, supra note 44, at Annex B.
See generally Szasz, supra note 11.
Recall that voters in Bosnia overwhelmingly vote with their ethnic groups. See

discussion, supra Part I.B.

112. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ANNUAL REPORT 1999
§ I available at http://www.gwdg.de/-jvr/hrch/99annrep.html ("The vast majority of
applications received by the Chamber relate to housing.").
113. See Kevesevic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/46, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 21 (Jan. 16, 1998) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS AND REPORTS 1998. Two factors underlie refusals by the
Federation and Republika Srpska governments to address legally the JNA cases. First,
the parties seeking the return of their property are typically minorities who served in an
opposing militia during the war (or are at least viewed as such). Second, the Ministries

of Defense in the Republika Srpska and the Federation prefer to reserve these former
JNA properties for their own officers and staff. Avdic, supra note 100.
114. See Palmer & Posa, supra note 77, at 371-72.
115. Id. See also Medan v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/3,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 4, 1997) (decision on admissibility).
116. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ANNUAL
REPORT 1996-1997 1 available at http://www.gwdg.de/-jvr/hrch/97annrep.html.

117. Palmer & Posa, supra note 77, at 372.
118. Medan v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/3, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 67, 77 (Feb. 4, 1997) (decision on admissibility) ("[l]t
is the responsibility of the Federation to take the necessary legislative or administrative
action to render ineffective the annulment of the applicants' contracts which was
imposed.").
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the order. 119
While the Chamber dickered with the JNA' cases, the widespread
assault on property rights continued through 1996 and 1997. A mob prevented 250 Serb refugees from visiting their former homes in Drvar; after
they departed, 35 of the homes were burned down. 120 In Mostar, extremists continued their policy of ethnic cleansing in the face of the international community. 1 2 1 When the United Nations High Commissioner on
Refugees pressured Bosnian Serbs to allow Bosniaks to visit their old
homes in Prijedor, 96 homes and 3 mosques were burned down. 12 2 After
the Chamber ordered the Serbian mayor of Banja Luca, the capital of the
Republic of Srpska, to allow three destroyed mosques to be rebuilt, the
123
mayor refused to comply.
In the face of the open onslaught against the Agreement, the international community did little to back up the Chamber.' 24 After the Chamber
informed the OHR of the Banja Luca mayor's' intransigence, the OHR
1 25
instructed the mayor to comply, an order that the mayor also ignored.
The OHR also directed the Federation to roll back its JNA legislation, but
26
the Federation ignored that order.'
2.

BureaucraticSabotage

The Parties to the Agreement proved themselves adept at undermining
the Chamber in other ways. First, the Federation cut off the Chamber's
funding. Under the Dayton Accord, the Parties agreed to be the sole source
of the Chamber's funding, formally making the Chamber a domestic institution. 1 2 7 But in the first two years, the Federation never included the
Chamber in its budget, claiming it lacked the money to do so. 12 8 At the
119. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ANNUAL REPORT 1998 (1998) available at http://
www.gwdg.de/-jvr/hrch/98annrep.html.
120. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, HOUSE

BURNINGS: OBSTRUCTION OF THE RIGHT TO

1 Uune 16, 1997) available at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
projects/balkans/bosnia/reports. See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BOSNIA AND HERZEGORETURN TO DRVAR

VINA:

BEYOND RESTRAINT,

POLITICS AND THE POLICING AGENDA OF THE UNITED NATIONS

1 (June 1998).
CRISIS GROUP, REUNIFYING MOSTAR, supra note 103, at 18;
United Nations Office of the High Representative, Human Rights Report 6-14 Sept. 1997,
HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW, Sept. 14, 1997. Similar post-Dayton evictions occurred
elsewhere in Bosnia. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 120.
122. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, GOING NOWHERE FAST: REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PERSONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 35 (May 1, 1997).
123. See Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/29, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (June 11, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS
CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JAN.-JULY 1999 (1999). For the
INTERNATIONAL POLICE TASK FORCE

121. See

INTERNATIONAL

mayor's reaction to the decision,
VINA, HUMAN

RIGHTS

see HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGO-

CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ANNUAL

REPORT

2000

(2000).
124. See Palmer & Posa, supra note 77, at 373.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 123, § 1.
126. Id.
127. Annex 6 of the Dayton Accord, Chapter I, Article 111(2).

128. See HUMAN

RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

supra note 116, § V.
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same time, however, nearly $1 billion in public funds apparently disappeared into corrupt pockets. 12 9 With no money coming domestically, the
Chamber turned to the international community for help, but here also, it
found little assistance. 130 Faced with few resources, the Chamber was
hard-pressed to operate in its first two years; its President resigned as a

result. 131
Similarly, the Parties shorted the officials obliged to carry out the
Chamber's rulings. The Republika Srpska boycotted the Chamber altogether, while the Federation simply failed to appoint a monitor to oversee
the rulings. 132 In 1998, the Federation finally appointed a monitor, but
133
provided no money to deal with the cases.
The Parties also bogged down the Chamber's procedures. In each case
before it, the Chamber is required to give every party a chance to respond
to the other side. 134 The Federation responded to a case against it in only
five of forty-eight cases. 135 When it did, it usually submitted nothing in
advance, but instead showed up at the public hearing and introduced allegations for the first time. 1 3 6 Often, the Federation would request additional time to submit responses and then would fail to follow-up on these
requests once granted.' 37 Since the Chamber must wait for the other Party
to respond to those allegations, the procedure could be delayed for
months. 138 Likewise, the Republika Srpska delayed proceedings against it
13 9
by routinely missing deadlines.
40
With all of these tactics, the Parties succeeded in their goal.'
Despite "the clear obligation on the Parties" to implement the Chamber's
decisions, "by the end of 1998 very few of its decisions had been fully
implemented by the State and Entity governments."'1 4 1 The Chamber was
left to forlornly conclude: "This goal [of developing a body of case law] will
remain purely theoretical if the State and Entity authorities do not also
' 14 2
work towards it."
129. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000 259 (2000) ("enormous amounts of
public funds appear to have been misused, enriching the ruling political elite rather than
benefiting the Bosnian population").
130. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 116, § V.
131. Id.
132. HUMAN

RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,

supra note 123, § IV.

133. Id.
134. Berg, supra note 55, at 2-3.
135. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119, § IV(E).
136. Id.
137. See Stanivuk v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/51, Human Rights Chamber for

Bosn. & Herz., para. 50-56 (June 11, 1999) compiled in

HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JAN.-JULY 1999 (1999).

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Palmer & Posa, supra note 77, at 368.
141. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119, §1.
142. Id.
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The Chamber Comes into its Own

Faced with the Parties' antagonism, the international forces ratcheted
up the pressure. The Peace Implementation Council, which oversees the
international operation in Bosnia, announced in 1998 it would condition
future aid on the Parties' cooperation and authorized the OHR to take a
tough stance against hostile factions. 14 3 In 1999, the OHR quickly began
to back up the Chamber. When the Federation still refused to rescind its
JNA law, the OHR implemented a law of its own rescinding the old measure. 1 44 Even more controversially, the OHR fired the mayor of Banja Luka
for ignoring the Chamber's order to allow mosques to be rebuilt. 145 The
Office also fired twenty-two other Bosnian officials, in part for their
obstruction of Chamber decisions in favor of refugees.
1.

The Chamber's New Strategies to Deal with Property Rights

At the same time that the international forces gave the Chamber
stronger support, the Chamber began to set sweeping precedents to help
refugees. First, it ruled that a violator could be fined punitive damages. In
fact, the Chamber has increasingly levied financial penalties against the
entities for the failure of local officials to properly implement the law. The
Chamber caseload in 2000 alone had the potential to present financial penalties between DM 1.5 million to DM 100 million to the entity
14 6
governments.
Case Bundling and Resolution of the JNA Cases

(a)

To tackle the backlog of cases, the Chamber began treating cases with
similar facts as quasi-class action cases, bundling them into one decision. 1 4 7 The Chamber's goal in selecting these decisions was to establish
legal precedents, forcing local officials to comply with the law. 148 The
Chamber also began to work with legal representatives of applicants, agreeing to accept cases "bundled" together as similar quasi-class action suits in
14 9
order to streamline the administration of justice.
The Chamber's new tack first arose in dealing with the glut of JNA
143. See Political Declaration from Ministerial Meeting of the Steering Committee of
the Peace Implementation Council (May 30, 1997) availableat http://www.ohr.int/pic/
default.asp?content id=5 180.
144. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119, § IV.
145. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 112, § I.
146.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 40, at 29.

147. See, e.g., Podvorac v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/2, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz. (June 12, 1998) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS AND REPORTS JAN.-JUNE 1998 53 (1998).

148. Nelson, supra note 69.
149. Interview with Therese Nelson, Executive Officer at the Human Rights Chamber
and Peter Kempees, Registrar, Human Rights Chamber, in Sarajevo, Bosn. & Herz. (Sept.
2000). Bundling allowed the Chamber to handle many cases with the similar facts and
legal claims in a more efficient and timely fashion. The new, more streamlined procedure also allowed legal representatives to present evidence of widespread discrimination
in a more compelling fashion.
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property cases stalled on the Chamber's docket. In Medan,' 50 Podvorac,151

Ostojic, 1 5 2 and Grbavac,15 3 the Chamber took similar cases lodged

between November 1997 and April 1998 and ruled that the Federation
could not deprive refugees of homes they had purchased before the war. 154
A similar set of bundled cases followed several months later. 155 This
formed a new pattern of action by the Chamber-to bundle sets of cases
dealing with the same legal issue or geographical area, 15 6 and follow up
decisions
with a second or third set of similar cases when the first set of
157
failed to produce the required action by government officials.
Recognizing the high stakes now attached to the decisions, the Parties
began responding to the complaints against them. For instance, when the
Chamber began asserting rigid deadlines for observations, the Parties
responded respectfully. 15 8 In doing so, the Chamber nearly quadrupled its
decisions in 1999, with a total of 206 decisions, many of them precedentsetting case law.

(b)

15 9

The Implementation of CRPC Decisions

In another important step in establishing the rule of law, in 2000 the
Chamber began to deal with the large number of Commission on Real
Property Claims (CRPC) decisions filed with the Chamber. The Dayton
Accords stabled the CRPC to serve as a forum for parties to establish legal
150. Medan v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/3, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 4, 1997) (decision on admissibility).
151. Podvorac v. Republika Srpska, CH/96/2, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (June 12, 1998).
152. Ostojic v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/82, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 15, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JAN.-JULY 1999 177 (1999).

153. Grbavac v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/81, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 15, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JAN.-JULY

1999 (1999).

154. The Chamber hoped that by bundling these cases it could hasten the enforcement of the JNA decisions. If local authorities did not follow these decisions then the
Chamber was prepared to revisit the JNA issue again in future sets of cases. Nelson,
supra note 69. In Karan v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., the Chamber extended its class-action
style decisions beyond the property cases to include detention cases. See Karan v. Fed'n
of Bosn. & Herz., CH/99/1992, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Nov. 4,

1999) compiled in

HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS

AUG.-DEC. 1999 (1999).
155. Huseljic v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/159, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (June 11, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER
FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS JAN. -JULY

1999 (1999).

156. The first of the cases bundled by geography came from the municipality of
Gradiska in the Republika Srpska. See Pletilic v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/659, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Sept. 10, 1999) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBE.R
I-OR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS AUG. -Dec. 1999 (1999). This set was followed
by a second set of cases from the same municipality. See Dizdarevic v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/1124, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (June 9, 2000).
157. See Nelson, supra note 69.
158. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119,
§ IV(C)(7).
159. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZE.GOVINA, supra note 112, § 1.
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ownership of property. However, even though CRPC decisions are final
and legally binding, local officials often refused either to acknowledge their
160
binding nature or to implement the decisions as required under the law.
Given the final nature of CRPC decisions, the Chamber reasoned that
one legally binding decision should be sufficient to resolve property disputes, and thus refused to issue further decisions. 16 1 This view changed in
2000, though, following the promulgation of a new law by the Office of the
High Representative defining a failure to implement a CRPC decision as a
violation of law. 16 2 Because administrative silence toward a CRPC decision now constituted a continuing violation, the Chamber could better
address problems with implementing the decisions.
Using the quasi-class action strategy the Chamber found that the Federation and its local officials had failed to properly implement CRPC decisions, and ordered the return of property to minority complainants. 16 3
And in a shift from previous years, by September 2001, the Federation was
fully complying with the Chamber decisions, returning the property to its
rightful owners and paying the Chamber's mandated financial
penalties. 164
2.

Poropatand the Foreign Currency Accounts Cases

On June 9, 2000, the Chamber held that it had the power to order the
legislature to take action to protect citizens' property, including foreign currency deposits established by citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the
former Yugoslavia before the civil war. 165 Citizens had been allowed to
deposit foreign currency into special foreign currency accounts in banks
within the country. A critical shortage of foreign currency in the late
160. See Nelson, supra note 69.
161. See Nelson, supra note 69. See also HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119, at § I.
162. Referred to as the Law on Implementation of the Decisions of the Commission
for Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (Oct. 27, 1999), availableat
http://www.crpc.org.ba/new/download/en/laws/RSCRPCENG.pdf.
163. The Chamber specifically found that delay tactics and misapplication of the law
by local officials constituted a violation of a citizen's rights under the ECHR and the
constitution and laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina. See, e.g., Bojkovski v. Bosn. & Herz.
and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/73, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Apr.
6, 2001); Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 9, 2001); Lazarevic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz.,
CH/00/3708, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 9, 2001).

164. HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER
DECISIONS ON ADMISSIBILITY AND MERITS: STATUS OF COMPLIANCE (2001) (internal chamber
document on file with author). In general all Chamber decisions involving property
matters generally provide for the affected state parties to comply with all ordered remedies within ninety days. Though not all the parties in the cases cited above have fully
complied with the Chamber's orders, as of September 2001 all the plaintiffs in these
cases had received their money and property. Avdic, supra note 100; Nelson, supra note
69.
165. Poropat v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/48, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (June 9, 2000). See also, Sp.L. v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/
1019, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Apr. 6, 2001).
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1980s and early 1990s saw .account holders increasingly restricted in their
access their foreign currency accounts. 166 Much of the foreign currency in
these accounts disappeared before and during the war, used either to
purchase arms for the conflict or "secretly deposited in foreign banks
67
abroad."1
The loss of these savings represented a huge capital transfer from the
general population to those with the ability to control and invest these
assets abroad during the war. 168 One expert cited in Poropat, a Central
Bank of Bosnia official, calculated that the pre-war savings of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was "three times higher than the current
budget of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina," one of the two entities comprising the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 169 This expert concluded that full reimbursement of the foreign savings accounts would lead
170
to the economic collapse of the country.
Not surprisingly, then, the government of Bosnia moved slowly to deal
with the foreign currency deposits. In some cases where citizens did manage to obtain a court decision ordering a successor bank to release the
account reserves to the account holder, the government simply ignored the
court order.1 7 1 In 1997 and 1998, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina effectively denied account holders all access to their accounts by
enacting legislation requiring all claims based on these foreign currency
accounts to be resolved through the process of privatization of all socially
172
owned property in the country.
The "Law on Settlement and Claims" allowed access to the value of
these accounts primarily through the privatization of socially owned apartments in the country. Under this law, the balance of all foreign currency
accounts listed in the financial records of banks were to be recreated in
"Unique Citizens Accounts," the value of which would be issued to the
account owner in the form of a certificate.' 73 As part of the privatization
process, these certificates could then be used to purchase apartments or
174
interest in public buildings or enterprises.
166. See Poropat v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/48, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 1 (June 9, 2000).

167. Id. para. 41.
168. As of March 31, 1991 the number of foreign currency accounts in Bosnia was
estimated to be approximately 660,000, with about 240,000 of these accounts containing amounts greater than DM 100. The total value of funds in these accounts was estimated to be approximately DM 2.36 billion. As of March 8, 1999, 75,077 depositors had
registered claims for a total of DM 696 million. Id. para. 82 (citing Office of the High
Representative data provided to the Chamber).
169. Id. para. 42.
170. Id.
171. See Sp.L. v. Republika Srpska, CH/98/1019, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn.
& Herz. (Apr. 6, 2001).
172. See Poropat v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/48, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 96-99 (June 9, 2000).
173. Id. para. 1-3.
174. Id. para. 3.
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The Poropats and the other applicants filed claims stating that they
wanted access to their accounts in cash. Many of the applicants to the
Chamber noted that they already owned their own homes, and were thus
ineligible to participate in the privatization process of socially owned
apartments. 175 Shut out of this process, the applicants noted that they
would be consigned to sell their certificates on the secondary market
where they could only recoup approximately five percent of the certificates'

value. 176
In reaching its decision in Poropat the Chamber balanced the greater
good of society against the rights of its citizens. 17 7 The Chamber ultimately found that the government had interfered with the rights of its citizens. 178 To strike a fair balance between the general interest in a stable
economy and the rights of citizens such the Poropats and their fellow foreign currency account holders, the Chamber ordered the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina to amend its privatization process. 179
The Chamber singled out several aspects of the government's actions it
found troubling. The Chamber was particularly disturbed that the government's decisions had diminished the value of privatization certificates by
giving greater value to cash payments over privatization certificates at the
same time that it sought to use these certificates as compensation for the
missing financial reserves of its citizens.' 8 0 The Chamber noted that the
result-an enormous capital transfer from the citizens to the governmentconstituted a failure of the government to fulfill its responsibility to
observe and protect the rights of its citizens.' 8 '
Thus, the Foreign Currency Accounts cases provided a critical watershed in which the Chamber defined and mandated the proper role of the
175. Id. para. 185.
176. Id. para. 5, 189.
177. Id. para. 178-93.
178. Id. para. 181-92.
179. Id. para. 204. The Chamber was particularly concerned with the fact that the
use of the certificate program transformed secure currency savings into forms of property, the value of which was uncertain, and thereby forced the account holders to
become investors against their will. The Chamber also noted that those parties who did
choose to participate in the privatization process with their certificates would not enjoy
the same discounts provided to those who paid in cash and therefore they were being
provided with a certificate which did not enjoy the same value as money. Id. para. 60,
187-188. Finally, the Chamber was also concerned over the two-year time limit on the
validity of the certificates, given that the slow pace of privatization in Bosnia hindered
the ability of citizens to utilize their certificates. Id. para. 186.
180. Id. para. 181-93. The Chamber was also troubled by evidence that senior government officials and others in the national and international community shared an
implicit understanding that the privatization process was to result in international interests purchasing the most financially attractive Bosnian enterprises, with certain Bosnian
business and political persons with the financial means purchasing many of the remaining enterprises. Id. para. 72-73.
181. Id. para. 181-93. As of late 2000, the Poropat decision remains to be fully implemented. This is primarily due to the fact that the Constitutional Court of Bosnia subsequently invalidated one of the national laws the Chamber relied upon in its decision.
The impact of the Constitutional Court's decision on the Poropat decision remains
unclear. Nelson, supra note 69.
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government and established itself as an accountability check on government abuses.
3.

Discrimination and the Chamber

The Chamber has also had a deep impact in the realm of discrimination and access to economic and social benefits. In one of its early decisions, the Chamber established that dealing with discrimination forms a
central purpose of the Dayton Accord and the institutions created in the
GFAP. 18 2 In its decisions dealing with discrimination claims, the Chamber
has sought to cut through the morass of quasi-legal acts and leftover wartime legislation in order to establish guidelines to handle discrimination
claims better, particularly those relating to employment and social
benefits.
In one prominent discrimination case-Zahirovic' 83 -the Chamber set
clear guidelines for appropriate government action. Zahirovic involved a
state-owned company that dismissed a worker during the war based on his
ethnicity.t 8 4 Following the war, the worker, along with a number of his
fellow workers who had suffered the same fate, sought removal from the
wait-lists on which they had been placed during the war' 85 and sought to
reclaim their jobs with their former employer. 18 6 Their employer and the
local officials denied the workers' demands, justifying their actions based
ethnic cleansing,
upon wartime regulations that provided a legal basis18 for
7
and the postwar economic situation in the country.
After the company refused to move them to active employment status,
Zahirovic and the others filed suit in municipal court in 1997, seeking reinstatement to their jobs. 188 The court rejected the suit in December 1997
182. See Hermas v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/45, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 18, 1998) compiled in HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, DECISIONS AND REPORTS 1998.

183. CH/97/67, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn.& Herz. (July 8, 1999) compiled in
HUMAN

RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA

AND HERZEGOVINA,

DECISIONS JAN.

-

JULY

1999

(1999).
184. Id. para. 1.
185. Id. The use of "waiting lists" was a common development in the employment
sector during the conflict of the 1990s. See id. para. 73-75. The term waiting lists refers
to the practice for handling excess employees during the wartime and postwar years in
Bosnia. Id. para. 74. To deal with employment issues arising out of the war and the
related ethnic cleansing, legislation was passed in all three wartime entities to provide a
system to resolve the status of these workers. See, e.g. id. (citing The Law on Working
Relations with Special Provisions for Wartime Circumstances, art. 7, para. 1, OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, Nov. 23, 1992, no. 21/92). These
lists provided workers who had been placed on waiting lists with certain legal rights,
including nominal payment of wages and certain social benefits, as well as rights of
reemployment. See Zahirovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/67, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 73-75 (July 8, 1999).
186. Zahirovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/67, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 73-75 (July 8, 1999).
187. Id. para. 83. In particular, local officials relied upon Article 5 of the Municipal
Decision on the Way of Implementing and Executing the Working Duty in the Livno
Area, issued June 2, 1992. See id.
188. Id. para. 1.
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without holding any hearings on the case. 18 9 'In response to this decision,
the plaintiffs then filed a second suit in January 1998.190 The case then sat
dormant until the local court began to hold hearings in the spring of 1999,
shortly before the decision of the Chamber in July 1999.191
The applicants in Zahirovic claimed that their treatment by their
employer and local officials constituted discrimination on the basis of their
ethnic or religious background. 1 9 2 To examine this claim the Chamber
consulted evidence from a number of sources, including field officers from
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the
Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman for Bosnia, the European Commission Monitoring Mission, as well as from national human rights activists. 1 9 3 This evidence documented the government's efforts to block
applicants from reclaiming their jobs. Specifically, the evidence included
statements that the Governor of the Canton had ordered judges not to hold
any hearings in employment discrimination cases 19 4 where a Bosniak or
Serb was the plaintiff and that any hearings actually held were only to be
done for the purposes of assisting in obscuring the discriminatory practices underway and deflecting the pressure of the international community. 1 9 5 The Chamber found that the evidence demonstrated
discriminatory treatment by officials based on ethnic or religious background,19 6 and that this was a violation of law that lacked any justification. 1 9 7 The Chamber then ordered Mr. Zahirovic reinstated and
compensated for losses he suffered during his attempts to reclaim his

job. 198
The Chamber has also addressed discrimination based upon religious
practice or identification, finding that local officials have used local courts
and administrative procedures to deny citizens the ability to practice their
religion. In doing so, the Chamber has ruled that merely cloaking discriminatory actions by using legal administrative processes is unlawful if the
purpose of the procedures is to discriminate against citizens based on their
religion or ethnicity. Thus, in one case, the Chamber struck down a local
municipality's order, which sought to block the use a of Muslim cemetery
and force a citizen to exhume the body of his wife from this cemetery and

189. Id. para. 29. In its decision, the court cited the suit as being incomplete in not
providing what it termed necessary information regarding the names and addresses of
the plaintiffs, along with other information including evidence and information about
the representation of the plaintiffs. Id.
190. Id. para. 30.
191. Id. para. 33-34.
192. Id. para. 2, 26-30.
193. See id. para. 35-72.
194. Id. para. 37, 57.
195. Id.
196. Id. para. 130-31.
197. Id. para. 130-36.
198. Id. para. 147-53.
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re-bury her in a non-existent cemetery. 19 9 In a later series of cases, the
Chamber ruled that bulldozing a set of mosques and subsequently building a parking lot on the land was illegal and a violation of the rights of
Muslim citizens.

20 0

The Chamber again found that such a discriminatory interference
with the applicants' rights could not be justified and was not in accordance
with the public interest. 20 1 The mere fact that local administrative organs
authorized the destructions did not prevent the actions from being
20 2
discriminatory.
The Chamber also has provided guidance as to what constitutes
acceptable government behavior in regulating its citizens' access to social
benefits. Secerbegovic20 3 deals with claims that the government had discriminated against citizens by issuing a decree that cut their postwar pen20 4
sions to one-half of the level of their pre-war JNA pensions.
In its decision, the Chamber compared the government's treatment of
JNA pensioners to its treatment of other groups of pensioners. While the
JNA pensioners were receiving less money than similar pensioners of the
wartime Army of RBiH and Army of the FBiH, the Chamber noted, the JNA
pensioners were still receiving more money than most pensioners in postwar Bosnia. 20 5 The Chamber also noted that the JNA pensioners had not
fought in the war, as had postwar pensioners of the Army of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. The Chamber also found that as the government entities of
199. Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republika Srpska, CH/99/2177, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 18, 23 (Feb. 11, 2000) ("Prnjavar graveyard"
case).
200. See Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/99/2656, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Dec. 6, 2000) ("Bijeljina and Janja Mosques" case);
Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/98/1062, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Nov. 9, 2000) ("Zvornik Mosques" case); Islamic Cmty. of
Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/96/29, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (June 11, 1999) ("Banja Luka" case).
201. See Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/99/2656, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 99-103 (Dec. 6, 2000); Islamic Cmty. of Bosn.
& Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/98/1062, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz.,
para. 97-100 (Nov. 9, 2000); Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/
99/2177, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 104-06 (Feb. 11, 2000).
202. See Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/98/1062, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 97-100 (Nov. 9, 2000); Islamic Cmty. of Bosn.
& Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/99/2656, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz.,
para. 99-103 (Dec. 6, 2000); Islamic Cmty. of Bosn. & Herz. v. Republican Spike, CH/
99/2177, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 104-06 (Feb. 11, 2000).
203. Secerbegovic, v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/706, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Apr. 7, 2000) (the "JNA Pensions" case).
204. Id. para. 1. All applicants in these cases had been officers in the pre-war Yugoslav National Army who had retired prior to 1992. After the war the new government
issued guidelines that stated that pensioners of the former JNA would receive a new
pension that was fifty percent of the pre-war pension. Id. This decree only affected former JNA pensions and did not have any impact on the pensions of civilian pensions or
the pensions of former members of the Armies of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id. para. 63.
205. Id. para. 20.
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Bosnia had inherited the JNA pensioners from the former "SFRY," the JNA
pensioners were in a legally different situation than general pensioners in
Bosnia. The Chamber found the setting of different pension levels in this
case to be a reasonable balancing of the public interest and the private
20 6
rights of citizens of Bosnia.
Thus, the Chamber found no discrimination and no unacceptable
interference with any property or other right of the JNA pensioners. In so
finding, the Chamber further expounded a type of acceptable balancing
between the public interest and private rights by a government pursuing its
public duties.
III.

The Impact of the Human Rights Chamber on the Rule of Law in
Bosnia

When the eight European judges landed in Sarajevo in 1996 to begin
serving on the Chamber, they encountered a judicial system that had literally been bombed to destruction. 20 7 Since the Chamber was the first of its
kind, it had no body of law upon which to build. 20 It took several years to
lay the groundwork for an efficient forum. 20 9 Most of the judges worked
,only part-time, meeting once a month, with no system in place to enforce
their official decisions. Worse, the backlog of cases had piled so high, it
would have taken ten years to clear the docket. 2 10 Further, the Chamber
faced inadequate financial support, a problem with which the Chamber
continues to struggle. 2 1 1 Despite these hardships, the Chamber has slowly
gained an increasingly important role in the implementation of the rule of
law in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Partly as a result of the increasing effectiveness of international
efforts, in 1999 many refugees watching from afar decided the moment
had arrived for them to return. Record numbers of refugees returned to
Bosnia in 1999, and even more returned in 2000.212 To deal with the flood
2 13
of new complaints, the Parties agreed to extend the Chamber's mandate.
At the same time, voters in Bosnia began to back moderate political leaders,
with the result that in many areas political parties calling for unity now
206. See id. para. 95-99.
207. See Nelson, supra note 69.
208. However, the Chamber relies on the European Court of Human Rights for advi-

sory power. See EKKEHARD STRAUSS, The Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Chamber in
Selected Areas of Human Rights Violations, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 41, 64 (2000).

209. See Nelson, supra note 69.
210. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER, supra note 53.
211. The Chamber received only 79% of its requested budget in 2000. In addition,
the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to fail to fully fund its obligations
to the Chamber. In 2000, the government allocated KM 400,000 to the Chamber, a
figure that is approximately ten percent of the overall budget of the Chamber. However,
only KM 250,000 was actually provided to the Chamber. Id. at 14. See also, Nelson,
supra note 69.
212. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 10.
213. See Network Bosnia News, July 18, 2000.

Cornell International Law Journal

Vol. 35

have as much strength as extreme nationalists. 2 14
A.

Adherence to Chamber Decisions by Local Authorities and the
Establishment of Effective Legal Precedents

,The slow movement by Bosnian authorities to respect the Chamber's
decisions reflects the increasing effectiveness of the Chamber in the late
1990s. In 1998, the Chamber issued final decisions in thirty-six cases, but
the respective governments fully complied with only five of these decisions. 21 5 However, by the end of 1999, the Federation increasingly com2 16
plied with the Chamber's decisions.
This trend continued through the year 2000. Excluding JNA apartment cases, the Chamber issued sixty-nine decisions requiring the respondent party to undertake some sort of action. 21 7 The respondent parties
fully complied with forty-three of these decisions, with either partial or
noncompliance in the remaining twenty-six decisions. 2 18 These results are
a bit misleading, though, because many of the cases themselves deal with
multiple cases. Thus, for instance, in Pletilic2 19 eighteen of twenty applicants had not regained possession of their property as ordered by the
Chamber, while in Basic v. Republika 2 20 twelve of fifteen applicants had
also not regained control of their property.
The set of Mostar property cases handled by the Chamber, also
reflects the judicial body's increasing impact in 2000 and 2001. Originally, the applicants' legal representative, the American Refugee Committee
Legal Aid Program in Bosnia, with the approval of the Chamber staff, submitted thirteen cases to the Chamber in the fall of 2000 as a collective legal
22
strategy. '
With the decisions in the cases of Francic and Turundic on February 2,
2001, and the subsequent decisions in the cases of Petrovic and Leko on
March 9, 2001, the Chamber sent a strong message to the Mostar East
municipal authorities regarding their failure to properly implement the
property laws. The local authorities apparently understood this message;
not only did the parties in these cases have their property returned to
2 22
them, but they also received the monetary awards dictated by the court.
21.4. See AIM Sarajevo, Who is the Real Winner? Forming of Post-Election Coalitions in B
& H, Dec. 3, 2000.
215. See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER FOR BOSNIA ANI) HERZEGOVINA, supra note 119, at 8.
21.6. By the end of 1999, the Federation had implemented approximately ten percent
of the Chamber's decisions, paid six of eight financial awards for non-property related
cases (the largest amount being DM 30,000). However, the Republican Spike continued
to obstruct and not comply with many of the decisions handed down by the Chamber.
See HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER, supra note 53.

217. Id. at 2.
218. Id. The majority of the cases originated in Republican Spike. Id.
219. Pletilic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/659, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (Sept. 10, 1999).
220. Basic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/752, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (Dec. 10, 1999).
221. Nelson, supra note 69.
222. Avdic, supra note 100.

2002

The Importance of Civil Law in the Transition to Peace

417

In addition, by September of 2001 the remaining parties in the original
thirteen cases submitted to the Chamber also reported the return of their
property.

22 3

Similar success occurred with the implementation of JNA apartment
decisions. The Chamber decided 117 cases involving violations of property owners' rights related to their JNA apartments. 224 By the end of 2000,
the respondent parties in 97of these cases had issued orders registering the
applicants as owners of the contested apartments, 2 25 and had paid the
226
compensation ordered by the Chamber in all 117 cases.
The Chamber has encouraged adherence to its decisions through the
use of financial awards and penalties. Increasingly, the Chamber has levied damages against government entities for administrative silence and
other acts of government obstruction-particularly for the emotional and
mental distress the government's actions caused applicants. Indeed, before
striking out cases that are resolved by amicable settlement, the Chamber
now examines the record of a case to determine whether the case involves
particularly egregious government behavior. If so, the Chamber may then
decide to award compensation to the applicant even though the govern2 27
ment has already returned the disputed property to the applicant.
These damages appear to have had an impact on the behavior of local
government officials. Although the Federation or Republika Srpska government (or in some cases the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is responsible for the payment of all financial damages awarded by the Chamber, in
property cases the possibility for increasing damage awards appears to
have coerced local officials in the Federation into complying with the law.
This appears to be due to the connection between damage awards the Federation must pay and allocation of local government budgets.
While the budgetary process between local governments and Federation ministries is murky, local officials have revealed that in some cases the
Federation is subtracting a portion of the damage award from local municipal budgets. 2 28 As a result, local officials are increasingly aware of the
need to comply with Chamber decisions. This result can be seen in the
Mostar CRPC cases. Following the initial set of decisions in these cases,
the parties settled and resolved all the remaining cases, returning the property in question before the Chamber issued its decisions. One factor
behind the quick resolution of these cases was a desire on the part of the
local municipalities to avoid having the Chamber award even further

223. Id. These parties reported the return of their property subsequent to the
Turundic, Petrovic and Leko decisions without any further action being taken by the
Chamber.
224. HUMAN RIGHTS

225.
226.
227.
228.

CHAMBER,

Id.
Id.
Nelson, supra note 69.
Avdic, supra note 100.

supra note 53, at 14.
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damages. 229
B. The Impact of the Chamber on the Rule of Law in Bosnia
Given the lack of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, any
efforts to reconstruct the legal system must require reasserting the legitimacy of the law itself. 230 In this regard, the Chamber has played a major

role in reestablishing the legitimacy of law itself, fulfilling a critical element
231
in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Bosnian legal system.
The Chamber has forced the governments in Bosnia to deal with critical
legal and economic issues, and has directly attacked the governments' misuse of the legal process to obfuscate and obstruct the legal rights of their
citizens. The Chamber has delineated the proper role of government in the
rule and administration of law, and has set limits on the23government's
2
legitimate exercise of its power in dealing with its citizens.
Thus, in Poropat,the Chamber concluded that even though the government of Bosnia may have pursued a legitimate goal in establishing a process to resolve the issue of access to pre-war foreign currency accounts, the
government failed to strike a fair balance between the public interest and
the rights of its citizens who owned these accounts. 23 3 In Poropat, the government had ignored the issue of the foreign currency accounts and the
legal rights of its citizens for years 2 34 until the Chamber finally forced the
235

government to deal with the issue.
In the administrative law realm, the Chamber has found human rights
violations where a government body failed to undertake timely action in
229. Id. Local officials are also particularly concerned that having a large number of

decisions brought against their municipality may result in increased intervention and
scrutiny in their municipality by the OHR, OSCE and UN. Id.
230. Ni Aolain, supra note 29,.at 961.
231. See id.
232. Another important contribution of the Chamber in this regard, not discussed in
this article, has come in the area of detention and the handling of suspected war
criminals by the respective governments in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In reviewing detention cases, the Chamber laid out the standards the respective government entities must meet. See, e.g. Momani v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz. CH/98/946,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Nov. 5, 1999); Marceta v. Fed'n of Bosn. &
Herz., CH/96/41, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Apr. 6, 1998). Similarly,
in interpreting and reviewing a number of so-called rules of the road cases, the Chamber
provided important guidelines in how government officials must deal with their desire
to arrest suspected war criminals while meeting the standards set forth in the Dayton
Accord. See, e.g. V.C. v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/1366, Human Rights Chamber
for Bosn. & Herz. (Mar. 9, 2000). The 'rules of the road' refers to paragraph 5 of the
Rome Agreement of the agreed measures of the Rome Statement. Rome Statement, Feb.
18, 1996, Bosn. & Herz. -Rep. of Spike-Fed'n Baja Luka. The parties to the conflict in
Bosnia signed this agreement delineating the legal guidelines for handling war criminals.
In this agreement, all parties agreed that an individual could only be charged by a
national court with genocide or war crimes if the indictment was first reviewed and
approved by International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (The Hague Tribunal). Id.
233. Poropat v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/48, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., 164-93 (June 9, 2000).
234. Id. para. 2-3, 65-66, 70, 152-56.
235. See Nelson, supra note 69.
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responding to the legal claims of citizens. In these decisions, the Chamber
rebuked the governments' attempts to obstruct the return process and
block citizens from reclaiming their legal property. Instead, the Chamber
established high standards for the government, finding that actions that
treat some citizens differently from the rest of society would be considered
discriminatory unless the government can provide a reasonable justifica236
tion for the treatment.
Federation and Republika Srpska officials argued repeatedly that they
could not adhere to the Dayton Accord and enforce the legal rights of refu2 37
gees because they were unable to control or influence local officials.
They also argued that refugees could not yet resort to the Chamber because
they had failed to exhaust all local remedies, even in cases where claims
2 38
had long languished.
Elsewhere, government bodies failed to respond to claims and appeals
as required by law. 239 Even where minority parties were successful in
securing a legal decision in their favor, government officials failed to
enforce the court or administrative decision. 240 In these cases, the governments justified the local officials' behavior in several different ways. First,
they argued that they lacked jurisdiction in the handling of property claims
and hence had no responsibility for the local officials' actions in
obstructing the return of property to minorities. 24 ' Alternatively, the governments claimed that their behavior in expropriating the property was
24 2
legal and that the applicants had no right to the property.

236. Id. See also Hermas v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/45, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 86 (Feb. 18, 1998).
237. See, e.g., Zahirovic v. Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/67, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 82, 101 (July 8, 1999).
238. See, e.g., Poropat v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/48,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 108, 152 Uune 9, 2000).
239. See Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 12-13 (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/
6144, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 11-14 (Mar. 9, 2001); Turundic
v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6143, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz.,
para. 9-12 (Feb. 8, 2001); Cuturic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/1171, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Oct. 8, 1999) (finding that although the applicant initiated
proceeding in 1993, the municipal court had still not provided any decision by 1999,
claiming another state agency had failed to provide the court with necessary information); Pletilic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/659, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz., para. 12-13, 22-23 (Sept. 10, 1999); Marija Stanivuk v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz.,
CH/97/51, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 42 Uune i1, 1999).
240. Bejdic v. Republican Spike, CH/96/27, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz. (June 11, 1999); Stanivuk v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/51, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (June 11, 1999) (non-enforcement of court order to repossess home); Blentic v. Republican Spike, CH/96/17, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn.
& Herz. (Dec. 3,1997).
241. Medan v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/3, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Feb. 4, 1997) (Federation claiming that housing policy was
the responsibility of canton and district officials).
242. See, e.g., Mahmutovic, v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/892, Human Rights
Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Oct. 8, 1999); Pletilic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/659,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Sept. 10, 1999); Kevesevic v. Fed'n of Bosn.
& Herz., CH/97/46, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz. (Jan. 16, 1998).
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In answering these arguments, the Chamber laid out clear guidelines
on the positive obligation of the government to protect the legal rights of its
citizens. To the argument that parties had failed to exhaust all of their
domestic remedies, the Chamber set the standard that the burden of proof
in claiming the existence of effective domestic remedies for its citizens lies
with the government. In establishing this proof of effective remedies, the
Chamber noted that the mere existence of remedies on paper is not sufficient-the government must demonstrate that remedies will be actual and
effective. 24 3 To the governments' argument that the Chamber lacked jurisdiction to deal with property claims filed with the court the Chamber
asserted its competence to consider all alleged and apparent violations of
human rights as provided in the European Convention for the Protection of
Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. This power was delineated in
Article II(2)(a) of the Dayton Agreement.
In Bulatovic, the Chamber made the Federation and the Republika Srpska governments directly responsible for the actions of their local officials. 24 4

The

Chamber

has

consistently

reiterated

this

principle,

upholding the positive obligation of the government to protect the rights of
24 5
its citizens as one of its most basic obligations.
In a series of decisions, the Chamber gave meaning to the nature of the
government's obligation to enforce the rights of its citizens. In response to
assertions that the government had legally expropriated property under
legislation passed during the war 24 6 or through a legitimate act of the local
authorities, 24 7 the Chamber noted that for a law to be legitimate, it must
meet several standards. Furthermore, the wartime legislation cited by the
243. Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn.
& Herz., para. 34-36 (Mar. 9, 2001) (existence of remedies must be sufficiently certain
not only in theory, but also in practice); Turundic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/
6143, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 39 (Feb. 8, 2001) (burden on
respondent to show remedies will be effective); Stanivuk v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/
97/51, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 41 (June 11, 1999); Onic v.
Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/58, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 38
(Feb. 12, 1999).
244. Bulatovic v. Bosn. & Herz. and Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/96/22, Human
Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 32 (Nov. 3, 1997) (stating that under the Dayton Agreement, the parties to the accord have a direct obligation to secure to all parties
their human rights and fundamental freedoms contained in the agreement and that the
parties are responsible for violations of human rights committed at any level of government organization).
245. See Blentic v. Republican Spike, CH/96/17, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. &
Herz., para. 28 (Dec. 3, 1997) (citing Art. I of the human rights agreement that all parties are obliged to secure to all persons in the jurisdiction of the government the highest
level of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms); Eracovic v.
Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/42, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 43
(Jan. 15, 1999).
246. See Pletilic v. Republican Spike, CH/98/659, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn.
& Herz., para. 1, 11-93 (Sept. 10, 1999); Kevesevic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/
46, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 16-20 (Jan. 16, 1998).
247. Mahmutovic, v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/98/892, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 66 (Oct. 8, 1999).
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2 48
government failed to meet these standards.
In several cases, the Federation argued that by merely passing property legislation that gave citizens the right to reclaim their property, the
Federation had enabled people to reclaim their property and therefore had
fulfilled the government's obligation to protect its citizens' property
rights. 24 9 The Federation government also claimed that if local authorities
had issued a decision recognizing the legal rights of a person to their property, that decision was, in and of itself, a return of the property. 2 50 The
Chamber, however, held that where the government fails to implement legislation or fails to assist parties in regaining possession of their property,
then the government's inaction constitutes an interference with citizens'
enjoyment of their possessions. 2 5 ' Similarly, the Chamber noted that
when local governments fail to issue a decision as required by law, that
failure illegally interferes with the rights of its citizens. 25 2 The failure of a
court or government agency to implement a decision was also shown to
25
violate the law.

3

Together, these decisions lay out a framework within which the government must defer to the individual rights of its citizens. In laying out
these precedents, the Chamber has taken the language of the ECHR and
the other international human rights covenants in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Constitution and given them meaning in the Bosnian legal context.
The attitude of the national and entity governments towards the
Chamber reflects the effectiveness of the Chamber in achieving the integration of the rule of law into legal processes in Bosnia. Over the last several
years, the Federation has increasingly come to accept the role of the Cham248. See Kevesevic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/46, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 50-58 (Jan. 16, 1998).
249. Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 33 (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 29 (Mar. 9, 2001); Turundic v. Fed'n of
Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6143, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 33 (Feb.
8, 2001).
250. Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 34 (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 30 (Mar. 9, 2001).
251. Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 57 (Mar. 9, 2001); Lazarevic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/
3708, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 44 (Mar. 9, 2001).
252. Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 59 (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 47 (Mar. 9, 2001); Lazarevic v. Fed'n of
Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/3708, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 46 (Mar.
9, 2001); Turundic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6143, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 59 (Feb. 8, 2001).
253. Petrovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6142, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 51 (Mar. 9, 2001); Leko v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6144,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 45 (Mar. 9, 2001); Lazarevic v. Fed'n of
Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/3708, Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 46 (Mar.
9, 2001); Turundic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/00/6143, Human Rights Chamber for
Bosn. & Herz., para. 48 (Feb. 8, 2001); Eracovic v. Fed'n of Bosn. & Herz., CH/97/42,
Human Rights Chamber for Bosn. & Herz., para. 52 (Jan. 15, 1999).
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ber and the concept of the rule of law on which the decisions of the Chamber are based. 25 4 Indeed the Federation is now so responsive in honoring
Chamber decisions that Chamber officials are now "fairly confident" that
the Federation will enact a decision by the Chamber, 2 55 even to the point
of carrying out the decisions before the deadlines established by the
25 6
Chamber.
Much of the improvement in relations between the Federation and the
Chamber is tied to two factors. First, the Council of Europe tied admission
to the Council in part to the governments of Bosnia successfully implementing and obeying legal decisions of the Chamber. 25 7 Second, the Federation, the Republika Srpska and the State of Bosnia and Herzegovia
appointed agents to handle relations with the Chamber. These agents have
established efficient procedures for carrying out Chamber decisions, and
as a result, Federation officials have increasingly complied with Chamber
decisions and the rule of law. 2 58 The same cannot be said of the Republika

Srpska and its officials. 25 9 The Republika Srpska's resistance to the Chamber and its rulings is part of the republic's larger process of obstructing of
the Dayton peace process. In part, this obstruction may point to the need
for the continuing presence of the Chamber and similar institutions in
Bosnia.
IV.

Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings

A. Transitional Justice in the Civil Law Setting
Transitional justice theory examines what it takes to establish a rule of
law in a civil society emerging from war and oppression. Transitional justice theorists have traditionally focused on war crimes, and are split over
whether postwar regimes require war crimes prosecutions or amnesties
before the society can emerge into a rule of law. 260 However, many transi-

tional justice theorists agree:
1) that instituting a democratic regime amounts to substituting a rule of law
for the use of force; 2) that upholding the rule of law amounts to making

every citizen accountable for his or her actions; 3) that instituting the principal of individual accountability amounts to securing that no group of citi-

zens will either benefit from the privilege of impunity or be collectively held
254. See Nelson, supra note 69.
255. Id.
256. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER, supra note 53.
257. See Nelson, supra note 69. See also OFFICE OF THE HIGH

REPRESENTATIVE, A
PREHENSIVE JUDICIAL REFORM STRATEGY FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(July

13-14

COM-

1999).

One concern for the Chamber here is that this requirement has since been dropped by
the Council of Europe. What impact this will have on the Chamber and its decisions in
the future is uncertain. See Nelson, supra note 69.
258. Nelson, supra note 69. An additional factor may be the increasing burden the
financial penalties of Chamber decisions represent to the Federation budget.
259. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER, supra note 53.
260. See Richard Lewis Siegel, TransitionalJustice: A Decade of Debate and Experience,
20 HUM. RTS. Q. 431, 438-39 (1998).

2002

The Importance of Civil Law in the Transition to Peace

423

26
responsible on the basis of their identity. '

It seems odd, then, that transitional justice theory gives scant attention
to the role that civil justice can play in a transition. After. all, by answering
human rights claims on property rights and discrimination, the Human
Rights Chamber is able to uphold a rule of law, make the individual
accountable for infringing upon or denying the rights of other citizens, and
reduce the level of discrimination based on group identity. Furthermore,
in considering the change in law, transitional justice theorists outline other
requirements that precisely reflect the Chamber's own experience.
First, transitional justice theorists speculate that in order to make the
break from the oppressive past, an entirely new court must enter the judicial stage, with the freedom to create new law, while reflecting conventional legality. 26 2 This new court must have well-defined limits and a
discrete life. 263 When the court turns away from the former system for
fear of justifying it, it often turns to international human rights law. This
legal turn "enables preservation of a sense of continuity and even the forging of a constructive prospectivity, thereby reconciling the goals of transfor'264
mation and normative change within an established legal system."
The Human Rights Chamber reflects this transitional justice requirement of a new, temporary court that applies new law. True, when the
Human Rights Chamber opened in Sarajevo in 1996, it faced a former
body of law that exacted justice depending on ethnicity.2 65 However, its
competence extended only to the international human rights conventions
incorporated in the constitution. Drawing on international law, it began
establishing precedent and building the groundwork for a new rule of law.
Second, transitional justice theorists often consider transitional justice's value as symbolic, rather than substantive. 2 66 However, this symbolism provides the public with an important alternative to vengeance or
violence, thus beginning the transition to a rule of law. "The transitional
legal response is deliberate, measured, restrained, and restraining; in their
transitional form, ritualized legal processes enable gradual, controlled
change."'26 7 Though it may be largely symbolic, transitional justice also
serves to define the rules and rights of citizenship, articulating the rights
2 68
and responsibilities of citizens while setting limits on state power.
261.

MICHAEL FEHER, Terms of Reconciliation, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLITICAL
GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA 325 (Carla Hess & Robert Post eds., 1999)
262. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 216 (2000).

TRANSI-

TIONS:

263. See generally id., at 220.
264. Id. at 222.
265. Zoran Pajic, An Overview of the Substantive Human Rights Regime After Dayton: A
CriticalAppraisal of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in POST-WAR PROTECTION

(1998).
266. TEITEL, supra note 262, at 220 ("Transitional law is above all symbolic-a secular
sanctification of the rituals and symbols of political transformation.").
267. Id. at 221.
OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 10

268. Id. at 221. See also TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON

WITH FORMER REGIMES 181 (Neil Kritz ed., 1995).
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The Chamber plays at least a symbolic part in defining citizens' rights
and providing an alternative to use of force to win back what they had lost.
Even though the Chamber decided 451 cases in 2000, it still faces a backlog of over 6,000 cases; hundreds of thousands more human rights victims
never filed a claim with the Chamber. Yet to neutral observers and possibly to the refugees themselves, the Chamber's decisions have had the effect
of helping instill a sense of the rule of law in Bosnia 269 because its rulings
give Bosnians equal rights, regardless of their ethnicity. The Chamber is
thus one of the only organs in Bosnia acting as a counterweight to partisan
political leaders. In this sense, the Chamber fills precisely that transitional
justice need for a ritualized legal process.
Given these obvious parallels between transitional justice theory and
Human Rights Chamber practice, it seems natural to ask why civil justice
has gone so unnoticed in discussions of transitional justice. The answer
may lie in the evolution of human rights. 2 70 Core human rights have
revolved around bodily integrity, such as torture, rape, summary imprisonment or execution and genocide. Next in priority come political and cultural rights, such as the right to expression, to vote and to participate in
society. Economic, social, and cultural rights lie along the outer ring of
human rights, unacknowledged by some states, merely aspired to by most,
but required only in Bosnia.
Nevertheless, most societies transitioning from oppression face lingering property and discrimination troubles. Adjudicating these disputes
through an international, independent court can lessen the chasm between
groups and help to instill the rule of law. In both theory and in practice,
then, the Human Rights Chamber can play a key role in the transition to
the rule of law.
B. Transitional Justice and the Role of Civil Law in Bosnia
By some measure, transitional justice may be the wrong course for a
state such as Bosnia. After all, a number of critics of the Dayton Accord
have argued that promoting integration in Bosnia is like King Chanute
holding back the tides-a futile attempt to stop nature from taking its
course. 27 t They assert that by keeping hostile factions in close range and
insecure about the future, international forces are actually promoting,
rather than preventing, conflict. Instead, they say, international forces
should allow the ethnic groups to consolidate, with their security serving
2 72
to promote stability.
This argument is misguided, however, for both pragmatic and theoretical reasons. Domestically, the conflict emerged from the strongholds of
269. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

GROUP,

supra note 10, at 6.

270. See Asbjorne Eide, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights, in EcoNOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 25-28 (Asbjorne Eide et. al. eds.,

1995) (Civil rights arrived in the 18th century, political rights in the 19th century, and
economic and social rights were born in the 20th century.).
271. See Thomas Friedman, No Sign of Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001 at A21.
272. Id.
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the ethnic factions. If the factions were allowed to consolidate through ethnic cleansing, the new unity could threaten neighboring ethnic groups with
old territorial claims, causing the conflict to flare anew. On the level of
transitional justice theory, if ethnic cleansing were allowed to hold, civil
injustices would fester and wait for the next conflict to be avenged.
An even greater problem may be diminishing the Chamber's role without upsetting Bosnia's balance of power. From the time the Dayton Accord
was signed, the international forces were aware they would have a problem
pulling out from Bosnia. "We set a five year -deadline, but we knew at the
time it would be more like a generation," said Paul Szasz, one of the architects of the Dayton Accord. 2 73 Once the international forces were in place
in Bosnia, intervention officials grew even more perplexed on how they
would get out. "We do not know, however, how we will exit, how we will
not perpetuate Bosnia's culture of dependency," observed Christian
274
Clages, head of the OHR's Political Department.
Furthermore, since the Chamber dispenses justice based on international human rights law, rather than on local law, the goal of status quo
ante is, by definition, out of reach. Thus, the Chamber is installing a new
regime of law despite the hostility from the local leaders. As one commentator noted, the result of the Dayton Accord is that a "two tier system of
legal accountability has been created . . . [where] the linkages among...
structures remain imprecisely defined, and subject to much local ambivalence."' 2 75 The danger is obvious. If the international community indeed

becomes a true trustee for Bosnia, local enforcement of the rule of law will
be much harder to encourage. After all, coercive violations of sovereignty
2 76
rarely make for stable regimes.
To establish the rule of law in Bosnia, the Bosnian legal system must
be able to stand on its own. 27 7 Without strong pressure from the international community, the domestic authorities would never have acceded to as
much of the Dayton Accord as they did;278 however, this strong influence
jeopardizes Bosnia's future, in that it brushes with autocracy. After the
OHR began flexing its muscle in 1998, its deputy representative told one
reporter, "we dictate what will be done.., those who resist will have to face
the consequences. ' 27 9 When the OHR fired the mayor of Banja Luka, one
273. Interview with Paul Szasz, former Legal Advisor to the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Oct. 18, 2000).
274. Hedges, supra note 39.
275. Ni Aolain, supra note 29, at 988; Avdic, supra note 100. Many local officials, at
least initially, viewed the Chamber and OHR and the legal decisions and laws promulgated by these institutions as law purely of these international bodies, which had no
national use and which would be abandoned once the international mandate and presence of these international institutions ended.
276. Stephen D. Krasner, Pervasive Not Perverse: Semi-Sovereigns as the Global Norm,
30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 651, 679 (1997).
277. Ni Aolain, supra note 29, at 961.
278. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2000 256 (2000).
279. Interview: Hanns H. Schumacher, Senior Deputy High Representative in DANI,
Apr., 1998, at <http://www.ohr.int/press.i198411a.htm> (last visited Sept. 2, 2000).
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Serb leader called the action "deeply antidemocratic. ''2 80 A Federation official said the firing of the 22 other officials amounted to declaring Bosnia a
281
protectorate of the international community.
If the Chamber's main goal is to establish a rule of law, it must provide
one of the key features of a working judiciary-efficiency. 2 82 Yet even at
the Chamber's most efficient pace, it would take several years to clear its
current backlog. Although the flood of applicants clearly represents faith
in the system, that confidence will quickly turn brittle if applicants must
wait years to have their rights recognized. Thus, speed is of vital importance to the success of this Chamber or future chambers like it.
Although an ideal strategy for pulling out eludes even the most veteran
experts, the conditions necessary for exit are clear. First, the institutions
necessary for the rule of law must pervade the local level. 28 3 Second, the
citizens must have full rights to their lawful property and the freedom to
live and move anywhere in Bosnia. 28 4 Finally, all groups in Bosnia must
have faith that they can turn over the keys to power to a rival group without
risking catastrophic loss. By creating the Human Rights Chamber, the
international forces have begun moving Bosnia down all three paths.

Conclusion
Once a war ends, a society in transition often focuses on war crimes,
but overlooks civil violations. A forum for civil cases can help turn a state
to a rule of law and a lasting peace. The Human Rights Chamber in Bosnia
and Herzegovina demonstrates what such a forum can do, and the
problems it faces when confronted by governments opposed to its goals.
The Chamber illustrates both the need for institutions of this nature in
implementing the rule of law, and the need for effective and ongoing international involvement to guarantee adherence to the rule of law in post-conflict settings.
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